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The text of this paper (excluding footnotes etc) comprises approximately 11,000 words 
The Paper examines the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Simpson v Attorney 
General (the "Baigent" case). It provides an analysis of the decision drawing out the major 
themes. The paper focus's on the Court's decision to create a new public law cause of 
action based upon the Bill of Rights. Analysing it contrast to the dissenting approach 
favoured by Gault J. The later part of the paper contrasts the direct liability approach of the 
majority with the problems of vicarious liability, using the United States constitutional tort 
as a model. 
The aim is to highlight the features of the Baigent cause of action, drawing attention to 
the specific remedial goals that are obtainable with such a cause of action. It possets the 
advantage of the majority decision is not only simplicity certainty but effectiveness. These 
advantages will need to be fully understood for future development of the cause of action. 
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"Baigent" : A Public Law Cause of Action for the Bill of 
Rights 
With its decision in Simpson v Attorney-General (The "Baigent" case) 
1 the 
Court of Appeal has created a new cause of action based upon the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
2 It is arguably its most far reaching Bill of 
Rights decision to date. Previous remedial action based upon the Bill of Rights 
has been confined to 'defensive' relief. Where rights have been infringed in the 
context of criminal procedure, the Court has developed the rule of prima facia 
exclusion of evidence. 
3 This has been characterised as using protected rights as 
a shield, where the remedy is designed to ward off, or make ineffective, 
government actions which breach those rights.
4 With the creation of the 
Baigent cause of action, the Court has forged a judicial sword, allowing 
citizens to actively attack government actions and seek a remedy where rights 
have been breached. 
An affirmative use of protected rights, raises questions which strike at the 
heart of civil rights jurisprudence.
5 It is here that the court will be most openly 
involved in weighing questions of policy and principle, while giving 
consideration to its legitimate role within the constitution. Thus the decision of 
the Court in Baigent presents an unprecedented scrutiny of the role of the Bill 
of Rights in the New Zealand legal framework. In a somewhat indirect 
1 Unreported, Court of Appeal, C.A. 207/93, 29 July 1994 (Cooke P, Hardie 
Boys, Casey, McKay JJ, & Gault J (dissenting in part)) [hereinafter "Baigent''] . 
2 Herein after the "Bill of Rights" or the "Bill". 
3 Noort v MOT; Curren v Police [1992] 1 NZLR 260 [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 
97; R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 [1990-92] 3 NZBORR 214, 
4 W E Dellinger "Of Rights and Remedies the Constitution as a Sword" 
(1972) 85 Harvard LR, 1532. 
5 See Dellinger above n. at 1533. 
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reference made within his decision, Gault J captured the unique nature of the 
issue that was before the Court In relation to past decisions involving the 
Court's application of the Bill of Rights he comments " ... [t]he focus in those 
cases ... was on the appropriate principles of interpretation rather than upon 
the status of the Act ... "
6 [emphasis added]. Indeed the importance of the 
Baigent decision is not only in creating the new public law remedy, but in the 
recognition of the elevated position of the Bill of Rights in the legal stratum. 
The focus of this paper will be on the nature of the cause of action that the 
Court of Appeal has adopted. In that it lies in public law rather than tort, and 
fixes directly upon the Crown. It is intended to show the Court has adopted a 
far sighted means of delivering an effective remedy. The paper divides into 
three parts. The first part looks at the decision of the Court, drawing out the 
reasoning and the underlying themes. The second part of the paper looks at the 
form of the action in public law, by contrasting it to the existing tort law 
approach advocated Gault J. The final part of the paper examines the 
advantages of direct liability of the Crown, as opposed to the vicarious liability 
that would arise under tort law remedies. This part of the paper draws heavily, 
as a contrast, on North American commentators and the United States system 
of "constitutional torts". The overall theme of the paper are the benefits 
obtained by through the Court's adoption of the Baigent cause of action. 
Those of certainty, simplicity and effectiveness. 
6 At p 7. 
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Part One: The Baigent Decision 
A) The Background 
Baigent came before the Court of Appeal on the matter of a striking out 
application granted by a Master of the High Court. 
7 Before the case had come 
to trial the Attorney-General had successfully sought to have claims struck out 
against him as disclosing no cause of action. The decision of the Master had 
been upheld on appeal in the High Court, 
8 and now arose before the Court of 
Appeal. Actions had been brought against the Crown not only in tort, but also 
under a separate claim based on s.21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, protecting against "unreasonable search and seizure". 
The case as pleaded involves the execution of a warrant containing a mistaken 
address. The police had intended to search the premises of a suspected drug 
dealer. They had obtained information the suspect was operating from a house 
on the main road of a Wellington suburb. The particular suburb had two main 
roads, and although police knew the number of the house, confusion arose as 
to which was the correct road. Based on misunderstood or mistaken customer 
7 Baigent v Attorney-General [1990-92] NZBORR 400 (Master Williams 
QC), 
8 Baigent v Attorney-General Unreported, 15 July 1993, High Court, 
Wellington Registry, CP No. 850/91 (Greig J.) 
information provided by the Hutt Valley Energy Board,9 the police obtained a 
warrant to search the appellant's property. It shared the same house number as 
the correct address, but was on the alternate of the two roads. Upon arriving 
on the property the police were informed by both a neighbour and the son of 
Ms Baigent that they had made some sort of mistake. The officer in charge was 
spoken to over the telephone, by the appellant's daughter, a Wellington 
barrister. When she informed him that the search was unlawful it is alleged he 
replied, "we often get it wrong, but while we are here we will look around 
anyway". The police proceeded with the search. 
As well as the 'unreasonable search' claim based on the Bill of Rights, 
multiple actions where claimed in tort. The Crown claimed immunity from 
these actions because of the extensive protection provided to an officer 
exercising a warrant. It was because of this extensive protection that the 
appellant had based a claim on the Bill of Rights. This is, it was claimed, an 
action lying in public law, outside of the immunity provisions which protect 
only against tort actions. Thus the Court had to decide whether the Bill of 
Rights gave rise to its own cause of action. 
B) Actions in Tort 
The claims made in tort present the law as it was pre-Baigent. As the 
bridesmaid to the Court's decision reached on the Bill of Rights, these claims 
provided the foundation required for the eventual findings. It was given the 
limited availability of these conventional causes of action that the Court looked 
to a claim based directly on the Bill of Rights. The following section of this 
9 The second defendant was not at issue in these proceedings. However, it 
raises interesting questions of privacy and breach of contract, based on the 
grounds that an Energy Board employee provided the information to the police 
despite the absence of a warrant or legal process 
paper will be concerned with examining the Court's reasoning in dealing with 
these claims. 
The appellant alleged there were four heads of tort liability; negligence in 
procuring the warrant, misfeasance in a public office/abuse of process and 
trespass of both property and goods. The only claim which was found wholly 
untenable, by all the judges of the Court of Appeal, was the claim based on 
negligence. It was rejected on the grounds an action will not lie for procuring 
the issue of a search warrant unless there is malice or absence of reasonable 
probable cause. 
10 
Immunity provisions 
Of the three tort actions the Court allowed to stand, availability had to be 
reconciled with the extensive immunity that acts to limit liability, where a 
warrant is being exercised. There are two broad categories of immunities. The 
first of these extends immunity to the individual officer. The second, while 
affording no protection to the officer, prevents the Crown being held tortiously 
liable by breaking the vicarious link. 
Police immunity 
In the first of these broad categories of immunities, the Crown relied on 
sections 26 and 27 of the Crimes Act 1961, and section 39 of the Police Act 
10 Everett v Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198, 205, Reynolds v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis [1985] 1 QB 881. 
1958.11 The provisions of the Crimes Act prevent criminal or civil liability 
arising from the execution of a warrant 
12 The Police Act, section 39, prevents 
an action lying against any member of the police acting "in obedience to the 
process" of executing the warrant. The Court agreed that these provisions only 
protect acts done under the warrant's authorisation, therefore they only "afford 
protection for those actions that are reasonably necessary for the execution of 
the warrant."
13 Cooke P observed: 
14 
naturally the law does not allow a search warrant to be executed in an unreasonable 
manner ... [f]or present purposes it is enough to state as a general proposition that in t
he 
particular circumstances the execution must be in good faith, reasonable and fair. 
The liability of the police for trespass and abuse of process, would therefore 
require a finding at trial that the officers had acted unreasonably and in bad 
faith. In commenting on the facts as pleaded, there was general agreement that 
the police actions did not amount to malice, they could however give rise to a 
finding of want of good faith. It was concluded that although the warrant was 
procured in good faith, by continuing with the search after realising that a 
mistake had been made, it was not a bona tide exercise of the warrant 
15 Thus 
if the facts were established at trial, the police would be unable to seek shelter 
under these immunity provisions. Crown liability would then depend upon 
whether immunity could prevent vicarious liability. 
11 Hardie Boys J, p 5, dismissed two of these provisions as not being 
applicable in this case, where the warrant at issue was not invalid. Stating of s. 
39 of the Police Act, "its purpose is plainly to protect an officer executing an 
invalid process", and s. 27 of the Crimes Act protects against "a warrant 
without jurisdiction". 
12 "Justified" as defined in section 2 of the Act. 
13 McKay J, p 6, seemed to require a higher standard of unreasonable conduct, 
unlike the objective test adopted by the other members of the Court, he 
formulated a subjective standard where the officer is not protected if "he 
knows [his conduct] is beyond the scope or purpose of the warrant"(emphasis 
added). 
14 As per Cooke P, p 5. 
15 Cooke P, p 8, defining malice as, "actuated by ill-will or other improper 
motive". See also Casey J, p 6,14, Hardie Boys J, p 4, McKay J, p 2, Gault J 
did not comment on point. 
Crown immunity 
The Crown receives an extensive immunity from section 6(5) of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950. This lies in the second category of immunities, those 
which protect the Crown from liability by breaking the vicarious link. The 
provision reads: 
No proceedings shall lie against the Crown by virtue of this section in respect of anything 
done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to discharge 
any responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he 
has in connection with the execution of judicial process. 
The contentious issue before the Court was the extent of immunity this 
provision provides where a police officer is exercising a warrant. The Court 
was asked by the appellant to read section 6(5) as not protecting an 
unreasonable search or seizure, consistent with section 21 of the Bill of 
Rights. 16 At this point Gault J departs from the majority finding of the Court 
Focusing on the meaning of 'purporting to discharge', as contained in section 
6(5), he held that: 
17 
.. . consistency with s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act requires that a person cannot be 
regarded as acting in the discharge or purported discharge of such responsibilities if 
acting maliciously or if engaged in an unreasonable search. 
Gault J was the only judge to adopt this conclusion. In the majority view the 
"plain meaning" of the subsection could not be read down. Hardie Boys J 
summed up the line taken by the majority when he said: "What was done need 
16 S 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states: "Whenever an enactment 
can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning". 
17 At p 26. 
not have been reasonable in manner or scope, for the subsection clearly 
contemplates unauthorised action".
18 Thus under existing tort law, situations 
could arise where the Crown is able to avoid liability, even though the 
wrongdoing clearly breaches the Bill of Rights. It was this inconsistency 
between the current law and the Bill of Rights, that acted as a springboard for 
the majority finding a cause of action based on the Bill. The difference between 
Gault J and the majority in their interpretation of section 6(5), reflects the 
differences on the Bill of Rights issue. In all the judgements, there was a 
common agreement on the importance of providing an effective remedy where 
rights have been breached. For Gault J however, the answer lay in amending 
existing law where at all possible.
19 For the majority, an effective remedy was 
provided by creating a new public law cause of action. 
C) The Nature of the Bill of Rights 
It is proposed to look first at the reasoning of the majority. The dissent of 
Gault J is examined in depth at the end of this part of the paper. 
The Status of the Bill of Rights 
The availability of remedies under the Bill of Rights has so far lacked critical 
judicial discussion. In cases involving the criminal process, the courts have 
allowed evidence to be excluded, however to base a positive cause of action 
upon the Bill requires a more careful scrutiny of its width and breadth. The Bill 
18 At p 10, similarly Casey J, p 14, commented: ''The phrase 'discharging or 
purporting to discharge' conveys the meaning of actually discharging the 
responsibilities; or of intending or professing to do so". Cooke P, p 8, held 
while the subsection could not protect the Crown from liability for the bad faith 
execution of a search warrant: "[I]t would be strained, in my opinion, to go 
further and hold that s. 6(5) does not cover an unreasonable execution of a 
search warrant carried out in good faith". 
19 The dissent of Gault J is discussed at length below, see "Gault's Dissent". 
itself is silent as to any remedial scheme. In the decision in Baigent much of the 
Court's time was spent of the Bill of Rights issue was considering whether the 
Act founds its own cause of action. The general focus was on the intention of 
parliament, this seemed to cluster around three main themes, the effect of the 
absence of a remedial clause; the purpose of the act as in its long title; general 
principles of interpretation. 
The Absence of a remedial scheme 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
20 contains a provision 
conferring on courts of competent jurisdiction an unfettered power to remedy a 
breach of the Charter.
21 A court may apply any such remedy as it considers 
"appropriate and just in the circumstances". The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
contains no such equivalent in its present form. However the original White 
Paper draft of the Bill of Rights contained a clause which was almost identical 
to the provision used in the Charter. 
22 Thus i~ Baigent, when determining the 
intent of Parliament, the Court not only had to grapple with the absence of a 
remedial clause but the fact that one that had been removed. 
The exact reason for the omission remains unclear. Hardie Boys J provided 
the most extensive review of the matter. The relevant extrinsic aids proved of 
little help, Hardie Boys J observed: "The history here is far from 
unequivocal". 23 He suggested a possible explanation for the omission, a view 
subsequently endorsed by Cooke P. In its original draft form the proposed law 
would have given courts the power to strike down statutes. Considerable 
2° Constituition Act, 1982, Part 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
[Hereinafter "the Charter"]. 
21 Section 24(1) of the Charter. 
22 Article 25, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand, A White Paper (1985, 
Department of Justice). 
23 Hardie Boys J, at p 14. The explanatory note to the 1989 Bill includes, 
"Action that violates those rights and freedoms will be unlawful. The Courts 
might enforce those rights in different ways in different contexts", cited by 
Cooke P, at p 13. 
negative reaction lead to the redrafting of the Bill in its present form. It is 
possible that remedial clause was removed in the move away from supreme 
entrenched law, being seen as instrumental to this power.
24 In the end, with 
only an indeterminate motive for the absence of a remedies clause, the Court 
did not put much store in its omission. 
25 
Long Title 
As an interpretative aid, emphasis was placed on the Long Title to the Act. 
This states its purpose as: 
An act-
(a) To affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New 
Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
The Long Title was used to introduce two considerations, firstly as to the 
intended scope of the Bill, and secondly by introducing international concerns. 
It was considered that the use of the phrase "affirm, protect and promote", 
indicated parliament intended the Bill to play an active role in the 
constitution.26 This conclusion was further supported from an analysis of New 
Zealand's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.27 Article 2(3)(a) of the Covenant, provides a State Party must make 
available an "effective remedy" where rights have been breached. The State 
24 Hardie Boys J, at p 14. 
25 Cooke P, at p 10, concluded it was "probably not of much consequence". 
26 It was equated with the Irish term "vindicate" which has been used to uphold 
a remedy under the Irish constitution, Cooke P, at p 11; Casey J, at p 17; 
McKay J, at p 7. 
27 999 UNTS 171. Entered into force 16 December 1966 [Hereinafter "the 
Covenant"] 
Party is also obliged to "develop the possibilities of judicial remedy" under 
Article 2(3)(b). There was general consensus that an Act which purports to 
affirm commitment to the Covenant must necessarily involve an effective 
remedy when breached. It was also noted that New Zealand ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention in 1989,
28 Casey J commented:29 
The Act reflects Covenant rights, and it would be a strange thing if Parliament, which 
passed it one year later, must be taken as contemplating that New Zealand citizens could 
go to the United Nations Committee in New York for appropriate redress, but it could not 
obtain it from our own Courts. 
It was recognised by the Court, decisions taken by the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations, under the Optional Protocol, indicate that 
compensation is a vital part of an effective remedy.
30 
General principles 
The Court found it unlikely that parliament intended a Bill of unenforceable 
rights. Reliance was placed on the old legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, where 
there is a right there is a remedy.
31 McKay J commented that it was difficult to 
comprehend that: "Parliament should solemnly confer certain rights which are 
not intended to be enforceable either by prosecution or civil remedy, and can 
28 999 UNTS 302. New Zealand accession date, 26 August 1989. 
29 At p 18. Hardie Boys J, at p 16, expressed a similar sentiment: "Citizens of 
New Zealand ought not to have to resort to international tribunals to obtain 
adaquate remedy for infringement of Covenant rights this country has affirmed 
by statute" 
30 Among others, Mbenge v Zaire Communication No 16/1977 Selected 
Decisions of the Human Rights Committee Vol 2, p 76, and Acosta v Uruguay 
Communication No 110/1981 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee Vol 2, p 148. 
31 Ashby v White 2 Ld Raym 938, 953.McKay J tracing its pedigree as far back 
as the Statute of Westminster II in 1285. 
therefore be denied or infringed with impunity."
32 Similar concerns were 
expressed that the Bill should not be mere "legislative window-dressing". 
33 
Hardie Boys J stated: "It is not lightly to be accepted that a statute expressing 
the fundamentals of a civilised society should be little more than sounding brass 
or tinkling cymbal."34 
The reasoning in this part of the Court's decision seems uncontroversial. 
Even Gault J, did not disagree that where there was a breach of the right there 
should be an effective remedy. It was at the next stage of the inquiry that Gault 
J dissented, differing over the means of delivering an effective remedy. It is 
perhaps a worthwhile to pause here to draw out a theme of the majority 
reasoning, one that differs markedly from Gault J. 
As has been stated this case involves questions which strike at the heart of the 
Bill of Rights in the legal framework. New Zealand's Bill of Rights is unique in 
many respects. Most obviously in its mode of passage as an ordinary statute. 
Unlike many examples of constitutional protection of rights, the Bill is not 
entrenched and contains its own limitations. Section 4 of the Bill circumscribes 
a court's power in its application to other enactments. A court is prohibited 
from declining to apply an enactment on grounds of inconsistency with the Bill 
or alternatively from applying the doctrine of implied repeal. 
35 Added to this 
the Bill lacks an express remedial provision. There seems ample weight for 
finding only a narrow scope of application for the Bill. However, as a guiding 
policy behind the decision of the majority, the emphasis is upon the 
fundamental importance of the rights protected in the Bill. In previous Bill of 
Rights cases this has lead the Court to adopting a broad and purposive 
approach, applying as a remedy the prima facia exclusion of evidence in 
criminal procedure. 36 In the majority decisions in Baigent, this approach was 
32 At p 6. 
33 At p 17. 
34 At p 2. 
35 Section 4(b) and 4(a) respectively. 
36 Noort v MOT,above n 3, p 139 as per Cooke P; p 151 as per Richardson J; R 
v Goodwin, above n 3, p 290, as per Richardson J: "A statement of 
taken a step further by looking at the importance of the subject matter, rather 
than the form of the Bill of Rights. Hardie Boys J said:
37 
Enjoyment of the basic human rights are the entitlement of every citizen, and their 
protection the obligation of every civilised state. They are inherent in and essential to the 
structure of society. They do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in which they 
are declared. (emphasis added) 
A similar statement was made by Casey J:
38 
The rights and freedoms affirmed are fundamental to a civilised society and justify a 
liberal and purposive interpretation of the Act, even though it has not been 
constitutionally entrenched and has the same status as ordinary legislation. 
As a window into the reasoning of the majority, these passages capture the 
underlying principles. These principles were implicitly in operation, when the 
majority adopted a public law cause of action, as a means of providing an 
effective remedy. 
D) A New Public Law Cause of Action 
Once it was decided that there should be a remedy for a breach of the Bill the 
question turned to the form it should take. During the course of their 
judgements, cases where cited from an extraordinarily wide range of 
jurisdictions. As diverse as Ireland, Canada, India, the United States, and Sri 
Lanka, and from such international tribunals as the Human Rights Committee 
of the United Nations and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The 
fundamental human rights would be a hollow shell and the enactment an 
elaborate charade if remedies were not available for breach." 
37 At p 21. 
38 At p 17. 
leading precedent however, comes from the Privy Council decision in Maharaj 
v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago. 
39 This was a case decided under 
the Trinidad constitution, where a judge had arbitrarily used his powers of 
committal for contempt of court. An immunity provision identical to 6(5) of 
the Crown Proceeding Act 1950, protected the Crown from the vicarious 
liability arising through the judge in tort. The Board decided that an action 
does not lie vicariously against the Crown, but is a direct public law liability.
40 
Therefore the action was not prevented by tort immunities. This reasoning was 
adopted by the majority in Baigent. As it applied to the case at hand, it meant 
the action would lie against the Crown, based directly on the Bill of Rights, 
regardless of the existing tort immunities. 
A jurisdictional view of the Cause of action 
An interesting jurisdictional question arises out of upholding the direct 
liability of the Crown. From what jurisdiction does the direct liability of the 
Crown emanate? Does the Bill of Rights act to directly limit Crown immunity? 
Civil proceedings against the Crown, those other than for judicial review, 
criminal proceedings or prerogative writs, are actionable under the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950.
41 The Act moderates the traditional Crown immunity 
from civil proceedings, where only crown servants could be sued.
42 It provides 
grounds for Crown liability on which potentially a Bill of Rights action could 
be based. If an action were to lie in tort it would be brought pursuant to 
section 6 of the Crown Proceedings Act. 
43 This provision allows the Crown to 
39 [1978] 2 All ER 670. See also Thornhill v Attorney General ofTrindad and 
Tobago [1981] AC 61(PC); Societe United Docks v Government of Mauritius 
[1985] AC 585 (PC). 
40 Above n, p 677. 
41 "Civil Proceedings" as per s 2 definition. 
42 P Hogg Liability of the Crown (2 ed, Carswel Co Ltd, Toronto, 1989) 80; 
S.Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (The Law Book Co, Sydney, 
1991) at 194 
43 The section defines the liability of the Crown in tort 
be vicariously liable, through the personal liability of a crown official. However 
the nature of the Baigent action is direct liability. 
There was little explicit discussion in the majority decisions as to the source 
of jurisdiction for direct liability. Hardie Boys J suggested that while such a 
claim may certainly be brought under s 3(2)(c) of the Crown Proceedings Act, 
an action may be altogether independent of that Act.
44 The later approach is 
more straightforward. The Bill of Rights expressly binds the Crown, as such it 
may be seen as creating its own grounds for government liability, not 
depending for existence upon the Crown Proceedings Act.
45 Thus the Bill of 
Rights like the Crown Proceedings Act, provides grounds of assault on Crown 
immunity. The consequences of a jurisdiction emanating from the Bill of Rights 
may be that courts will take a limited view as to when that jurisdiction can be 
ousted. This would be consistent with the wide and purposive approach taken 
by the Court of Appeal thus far. It may however highlight a disparity in the 
court's jurisdiction when it is obliged to apply an inconsistent enactment 
46 It is 
not inconceivable where a court is so bound, it may be put in the position of 
having to apply the inconsistent enactment and offset the harm through a 
monetary award of damages for the breach of rights. 
Procedural matters 
44 Hardie Boys J, at p 11. S 3(2)(c) allows a claim against the Crown based, 
" ... under any act which is binding on the Crown, and for which there is not 
another equally convenient or more conveniant remedy against the Crown." 
45 S 5(k) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 provides; "No provision or 
enactment in any Act shall in any manner affect the rights of Her Majesty, her 
heirs or successors, unless it is expressly stated therein that [Her Majesty] shall 
be bound thereby".Section 3 of the Bill of Rights expressly states it application 
to the Crown. 
46 Section 4, see above text "General Principles" 
Although Baigent involved a claim for monetary redress, in opening up the 
new cause of action the Court indicated that a full range of remedies will be 
available.47 In his judgement Cooke P, outlined the procedure which should be 
followed for a Bill of Rights claim.48 He envisaged that cases would generally 
be heard before a judge rather than a trial by jury. To avoid double recovery 
under a concurrent cause of action, other awards would have to be taken into 
account. Alternatively, and for simplicity, a global award could be made under 
the Bill of Rights and nominal or concurrent awards on any other successful 
causes of action. Compensation should include not only physical and intangible 
harm but a reflection of the gravity of the breach and the need to emphasise the 
importance of the rights and deter breaches. Hardie Boys J added to this that 
the emphasis must be on the compensatory and not the punitive element, "the 
objective is to affirm the right, not punish the transgressor''.
49 
On the issue of quantum, in this case where there was no physical harm or 
lasting consequences, $70,000 was sought. Cooke P commented that without 
having heard argument on the point, he could only give an indication to the 
trial court that an award of "somewhat less" would be sufficient vindication. 
The founding of a new cause of action which might give rise to substantial 
damages, raises major questions concerning the Accident Compensation 
system. Where physical injury results, for example, the relationship between a 
Bill of Rights action and the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Act 1992, will need to be established. On its face, this new action 
will lie outside of any ACC claim - a major development. Future developments 
will also include the need to develop a jurisprudential approach for the 
selection of the appropriate remedy. Matters of Quantum will also have to be 
resolved, for what will often be intangible harm. 
47 As per Cooke Pat p 11 and 12, Casey J at p 20, Hardie Boys J at p 22 and 
McKay J at p 7. 
48 At p 15-16. 
49 At p 22. 
E) Gault's dissent 
Early on in his judgement, Gault J observed there were two competing ways 
the Court could interpret the Bill of Rights Act.
5° Firstly, as a constitutional 
document which gives rise to a cause of action lying directly against the state. 
Secondly, as an ordinary statute, not creating any new causes of action, but as 
declaration of principles, aiding in the interpretation of existing law. Where the 
majority found the Bill could and should support its own cause of action, Gault 
J dissented. In his view the Bill should be treated as a;" ... formal identification 
of principles or ideas already operating in the law to a significant extent".
51 
Gault' s adoption of this later alternative reflects the importance he placed on 
the enacted form of the Bill. In common with the majority he concluded that 
the purpose of the Bill was to affirmatively protect the rights and freedoms. His 
departure from the majority view centred on a differing account of the 
underlying parliamentary intent He concluded there was the underlying 
presumption when the Bill was enacted, that existing law was sufficient to fulfil 
the intended purposes of the Act. 5
2 In support of his dissent he looked to the 
form in which the Bill was enacted. He noted it was passed as an ordinary 
statute, not as entrenched or supreme law, as first proposed. Attention was 
given to the prescribed limitations within the Bill, and the absence of a remedial 
scheme if rights are breached. He then went on to contrast this with the 
purpose of the Bill, not only in protecting rights in New Zealand but affirming 
the Crown's international obligation to provide an effective remedy. He 
concluded that when the Bill was passed there was a presumption that existing 
law met these requirements, and that it does not create any new independent 
causes of action. 
50 At p 3. 
51 At p 14. 
52 At p 3, 9. 
The emphasis placed by Gault J, on the enacted form of the Bill and his 
resulting findings, differs considerably from the approach and conclusions of 
the majority. For the majority the decision was guided by the substance of the 
Bill, one of fundamental rights and freedoms, rather than its statutory form. 
This can be contrasted with the view of Gault J where he said: "In the absence 
of entrenched supreme law there is no imperative to accord greater status to 
the rights affirmed in the Act "53 
It may be unfair to characterise the decision of Gault J as attributing less 
importance to the rights and freedoms in the Bill. Like the majority, he stressed 
the importance of providing an effective remedy where rights have been 
breached, he differed however in the form which a remedy should take. It 
should be noted that he was the only judge willing to read down section 6(5) of 
the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. It may be speculated Gault's approach is 
based on a more reserved outlook on the role of the judiciary. He was the only 
judge to comment the legitimate role of the court. After deciding that the Bill 
was passed with the presumption that existing law could provide an effective 
remedy he commented: "It would be entirely consistent with the constitutional 
role of our Courts, where it is open on the proper construction of the Act, to 
validate the presumption on which it was enacted". 
54 
This difference in approach from the majority is reflected in the respective 
treatment of the precedents. The majority applied the Maharaj case as 
authority for a public law cause of action, Gault J distinguished the case on 
two grounds. He contented that, unlike the New Zealand Bill of Rights, the 
case involved a constitution with an express remedies clause. The second 
ground he applied to all the precedents, reflecting his view of the Bill. In stark 
contrast to the majority view, he distinguished the New Zealand document: 
"the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is not a constitution such as were under 
53 At p 19. 
54 At p 10. 
consideration in the authorities just referred to."ss He thus rejected the majority 
view opting instead for his 'existing law' approach. 
The final parts of this paper will be spent looking at the issues which arise 
from the choice of the form of the majority cause of action. Two important 
highlights flow from the majority decision in Baigent. Firstly by basing a cause 
of action directly on the Bill of Rights, a claim is removed from the vagaries of 
tort doctrine. As a source of contrast use is made of the existing law approach 
advocated by Gault J. Looking at the problems encountered by using tort 
doctrines in Bill of Rights remediation. The second part of this analysis focuses 
on the advantage of direct liability over the alternative vicarious model of tort 
liability. As a source of contrast use will be made of the United States system 
of "constitutional torts". 
Part Two: Existing Tort Law v Public Law 
In the view of Gault J actions already existing in law are not merely sufficient 
but the legitimate way for the courts to protect the Bill of Rights. As a 
summary of his approach, he states where existing law provides an effective 
remedy, that is all that is needed: "Where it does not, an effective remedy is to 
be available either by modification or development of the existing law or, 
SS At p 7. 
where that is not possible, by separate right of civil action[for breach of 
stautory duty]".56 
Gault J provides as examples the rights to freedom of movement, to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure, and not to be arbitrarily arrested or 
detained, as being protected by the torts of false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, assault and trespass. 57 It is undoubtable that many of the rights 
protected in the Bill are within the ambit of current causes of action. 58 It has 
been suggested that only the most of extreme of cases will fall outside of 
currently available remedies. 59 Some rights however have no equivalent in the 
common law,60 for example the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of 
association, freedom of thought, religion and belief, and freedom from 
discrimination. Here Gault J suggests that existing law may be modified or 
alternatively there could be an action for a breach of statutory duty.61 
The modification of existing law introduces complexity and uncertainty to a 
Bill of Rights claim. As observed by Casey J, the formal protection of civil and 
political rights is something new in or legal pantheon.62 The Bill is a rare 
example in our constitution, by providing explicit undertakings in the 
56 At p 12. 
57 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ss 18, 21 and 22 respectively. Cited by 
Gault J at p 16. Examples from Todd, above n 42, at 924. 
58 See Todd above n 42, at 924; Justice and Law Reform Comittee Inquiry into 
the White Paper - A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (2nd Sess, 41 Parl, 1987) 
para 10.184; P Rish worth 'The Potential of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" 
[1990] NZLJ 68, 72; J F Burrows Statute Law in New 'Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1992) 335-336; D Paciocco "Remedies for Violations of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" in D Paciocco and P Rishworth Essays on the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 
publication no 32, 1992) p 45 
59 D. Paciocco, above n, p 45, he cites the experience of the Canadian Charter 
in support. 
60 Some equality rights do receive protection from statute, for example in the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977, see Gault J p 16. 
61 Available against the Crown pursuant to s 3(2)(c) of the Crown Proceedings 
Act 1950, above n 44, it allows a cause of action against the Crown under any 
Act to be binding on the Crown, Gault J, at p 20. 
62 At p 18. 
relationship between state and citizen. In itself possibly this is not enough to 
distinguish it from current private law. Both Bill of Rights actions and private 
law involve balancing the competing interests of various parties in society, in 
accordance with a particular conception of the good life. 63 However civil and 
political rights protect a set of interests that are different and not traditionally 
those interests protected in common law redemption. Traditional interests can 
be broadly classified as the protection of property rights, personal safety and 
economic security.64 The 'existing law' approach of Gault J, in applying 
current tort actions to Bill of Rights cases, requires a change in the focus in the 
interests protected. Changes would not only be necessary to the available 
causes of action, and their application to the Crown but in relation to damages 
may also entail changes to remedial principles. 
As a means of protecting constitutional interests the use of existing law 
appears unnecessarily cumbersome. Current heads of tort seem particularly 
untuned when applied to Bill of Rights concerns. At one point, for example, 
Gault J suggests for breaches of civil and political rights, the expansion of the 
growing common law tort of protecting injured feelings. 65 Using the tort in this 
manner may conceivably lead to a situation where peaceful assembly is being 
protected on the grounds of 'injury to feelings'. As a rationale, this falls a 
good way short of grasping the importance or significance of the right. Similar 
considerations are raised in the extension of established causes of action, the 
traditional protected interests may not be on parity with Bill of Rights interests. 
For example, using trespass to cover claims of unreasonable search and 
seizure. The particular wrongdoing the right is aimed at, is not the invasion of 
property rights, but the abuse or misuse of government power to achieve these 
ends. 
63 As an adherent to this position see A Petter "Private Rights/ Public Wrongs: 
The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U Toronto L J 278. 
64 Kercher & Noone Remedies (2 ed, The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 
80-81. 
65 At p 19. 
A) Breach of Statutory Duty 
The alternative to applying currently available causes of action, Gault J 
suggests, is where appropriate use breach of statutory duty. As an area of law, 
the tort has been described as one of the least principled in the books.66 For an 
action to succeed under the tort, the plaintiff must show the statute puts a clear 
duty on the defendant personally, owing to the plaintiff, and the damage caused 
by the breach was of a kind that the statute was designed to prevent.67 Beyond 
these broadly worded principles, cases provide only minimal guidance, the hunt 
for implicit duties being heavily reliant on policy grounds.68 Arguably with a 
little creative judicial law making, the tort may be all things to everyone. Thus 
Hardie Boys J, in Baigent, rejected the tort as unsuitable on grounds that the 
Bill of Rights does not impose sufficiently clear duties. 69 Gault J on the other 
hand saw it as a viable means of plugging the gaps in the existing tort law 
approach. The indeterminate nature of the action, perhaps in itself renders it 
inappropriate for Bill of Rights claims. The focus of a claim should be on the 
merits of remedial action, rather than the contents of an uncertain doctrine. If 
the majority view in Baigent can be charactered as judicial legislation it seems 
the tort of breach of statutory duty is an equally nebulous area of law. Dickson 
J of the Supreme Court in Canada, in declaring the tort not a part of Canadian 
66 Todd, above n 42, p 327. 
67 Todd, above n 42, p 340-41. Paciocco, above n 58, p 71, suggests with the 
last requirement of contemplated damage, exemplary damages may be 
excluded, with the focus being on the compensation for injury. As an 
alternative view, because the Bill of Rights protects against abuse of 
government power, it may be that exemplary damages are awards within the 
contemplation of the statute. 
68 Todd, above n 42 at 336. 
69 At p 11-12, "And while it may truely be said that the converse of a right is a 
duty to observe it, that simple proposition is not enough to found the tort of 
breach of statutory duty." 
law, called the search for parliamentary intent a "bare faced fiction". 70 The 
direct liability approach adopted in Baigent has the advantage of simplicity and 
certainty. Beyond this, a breach of statutory duty is grounded in tort, further 
encountering the general problems which must be met in any tort claim against 
the Crown. 
B) Crown Liability in Tort 
There are two problems with the scope of tort liability of the Crown. Firstly, 
tort liability arises only vicariously on the Crown, based on the personal 
liability of an official, the implications of this are gone into at length below.71 
Secondly, there are a number of limitations on Crown liability in tort. Not only 
are there are numerous sources of immunity which protect government 
officials,72 but restrictions are placed upon the vicarious liability of the Crown 
itself. Both of these types of immunities were at issue in Baigent, and a 
deciding factor in finding a cause of action based in public law, free from 
immunities. Hardie Boys J commenting on the scope of existing actions in 
common law said:" ... [T]hese will often be so uncertain or ringed with Crown 
immunity as to render them of little value".73 To be able to provide a 
consistency in redress for Bill of Rights claims, wherever these immunities are 
encountered they will have to be read down. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights 
allows a court to give an enactment a meaning consistent with rights contained 
in it. However any such interpretation needs to be reconciled with section 4 of 
the Bill, requiring that a court must not decline to apply or make invalid or 
70 R v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1983) 143 DLR 464,478. 
71 See text below, "Part Three". 
72 For example, a variety of protection is extended to police under the Crimes 
Act 1961 and Police Act 1958. At Common law there is the immunity of 
Judges of superior courts Miller v Hope (1824) 2 Sh.Sc.App., and ins. 193 of 
the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, a limited immunity for District Court 
Judges. 
73 Atp 14. 
ineffective, an inconsistent provision. In Baigent the majority refused to read 
down the "plain meaning" of section 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. 
Thus an action in tort faces the uncertainty and possible circumvention of 
liability introduced by various shields of immunity. 
Another aspect of Crown liability is the general limitation placed upon its 
scope by Section 6(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. This section 
actually allows the liability of the Crown in tort but only so far as "if it were a 
private person of full age and capacity." The Bill of Rights applies only to acts 
of Crown, extending Bill of Rights modifications of tort to private law requires 
careful consideration. In Baigent, Hardie Boys J cited the inappropriateness of 
extending the tort universally, as one of the grounds for refusing to modify 
abuse of process to cover the negligent procuring of a search warrant. 
74 While 
a court may find a way to get around this provision, it adds complexity and 
uncertainty. 
C) The Availability of Monetary Compensation in Tort 
Using traditional tort damages to compensate for a Bill of Rights claim raises 
its own set of problems. The Bill of Rights requires compensation for different 
interests than traditionally protected in tort. There is also the question of 
whether tort law has the machinery to cope with these changes. The traditional 
focus of tort compensation is on the tangible harm caused to the victim. The 
rationale of tort damages is to put the plaintiff in the same position had the 
wrongdoing not occurred. 75 This presents something of an obstacle to 
grounding Bill of Rights liability in tort. Attempts to correlate money with 
injury suffered, on this basis, appears strained in relation to breaches of civil 
74 See above text, "Part One: Actions in Tort".Hardie Boys J, at p 4. 
75 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39 per Lord 
Blackburn. 
rights not resulting in actual physical damage. 76 In particular where the harm 
flowing from breaches of rights is completely nonpecuniary. For example, a 
denial of a right to free speech or peaceful assembly seems difficult to quantify 
in monetary terms. In theories that advocate compensating for breaches of civil 
rights per se, the focus shifts from making the victim 'whole', to the wider 
societal interests at stake.77 An award is made on the basis of the inherent value 
of the right to society, accentuating the underlying moral norms.
78 The 
rationale moves beyond pure compensation of the individual, to compensation 
for benefits received by all society in upholding the rights. If a right can be 
violated at will, without remedial consequences, it may be argued it is not a 
right at all. 79 Thus the focus of compensation in Bill of Rights law calls for a 
wider ambit than just tangible harm. This was recognised in Baigent where it 
was said that an award could be made to "emphasise the importance of the 
right". 80 
Of non-compensatory damages in tort, the court may award either nominal or 
exemplary damages.81 Nominal damages in a Bill of Rights claims achieve little. 
They posses no deterrent value, other than the stigma or inconvenience of 
being sued, and do little to vindicate the right Making exemplary damages the 
work horse of Bill of Rights claims also present difficulties. Exemplary 
damages are awarded where there is an oppressive or high handed abuse of the 
victims rights. 82 The award is not linked to the actual harm caused and instead 
76 B Friedman "When Rights encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies" 
(1992) 65 SCLRev 735, 742. 
77 See, eg, M L Pilkington "Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" ( 1982) 62 Can Bar Rev 517, 538. 
78 P Shuck Suing Government: Citizens Remedies for Official Wrongs (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1983) 24 
79 W M Hohfield "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning" (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16, 30-34,where Hohfield would classify this as 
a "privilege" rather than a right in the strict sense. 
8° Cooke P, at 15, similar statements were made by; Hardie Boys J, at 22, and 
Casey J, at 20. 
81 Kercher and Noone, above n 64, at 177 
82 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 at 1226. Auckland City Council v 
Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732. 
focuses on the conduct of the wrongdoer. In relation to claims for Bill of 
Rights, this focus may prove inappropriate. The award requires on behalf of 
the wrongdoer, either malice, wilfulness or as a minimum standard, 
recklessness,. 83 This may effectively deny a deserving Bill of Rights claimant 
damages where rights have been infringed negligently or otherwise. A further 
difficulty with exemplary damages is that a claim is unable to survive the death 
of the applicant. Section 3(1) of the Law Reform Act 1936 prevents the claim 
for exemplary damages passing with the estate.84 When compounded with the 
effect of Accident Compensation legislation preventing compensatory damages 
the effect is particularly insidious. As a worse case scenario it could arise that a 
victim deprived of their right to life can receive no Bill of Rights compensation. 
Tort law is weighed heavily by doctrines which restrict the scope of Crown 
liability or prevent adequate redress. Making torts available which encompass 
Bill of Rights interests is cumbersome and may prove unnecessarily restrictive. 
An effective 'existing law' approach would require a high degree of creative 
law making, which if not always result an effective remedy, would certainly 
serve to muddy current doctrines. As a process in itself it diverts attention from 
the real issue on the merits of granting a remedy. Hardie Boys J commented:
85 
While it may be argued that conventional common law doctrines must needs be 
developed in accordance with the spirit and intendment of the Bill of Rights, that would 
at best be a piecemeal approach, conducive to much uncertainty. 
The new cause of action adopted in Baigent, by lying outside of the confines of 
tort, provides something of a clean slate. It possess the advantages of 
simplicity, certainty and overall effectiveness. 
83 Todd, above n 42 at 872; Kercher and Noone, above n 64, at 363. 
84 Re Chase [1989] 1 NZLR 325. 
85 At 12. 
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Part Three: Direct Crown Liability v Vicarious Liability 
A large part of the rationale for finding a new public law cause of action was 
that the Bill of Rights was seen as imposing direct obligations on the state. 
Alternatively, the Court could have followed the reasoning of Gault J, using 
pre-existing law, or adopted a model similar to the United States 
'constitutional tort'. For either of the two, supporting a successful action 
would involve first finding an official who would be liable, Crown liability 
would then depend on establishing a vicarious link. From the Baigent model 
with a direct obligation imposed upon the state, elements of uncertainty are 
introduced in two areas. Firstly the difficulty of establishing the individual 
liability and then the resulting vicarious link. Secondly by introducing the 
interests of the liable official into the already complex equation of balancing the 
interests of the individual with those of the wider interests that the Crown 
represents. 
A) Vicarious Crown liability 
With the advent of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 the Crown can, with 
limited exceptions, be held vicariously liable as if it were an ordinary 
employer.86 Crown liability attaches where a wrongful act is committed by an 
employee, in a proximate relationship, and where the wrongdoing arises in the 
course of his or her employment 
87 The proximate relationship is typically 
satisfied where the wrongdoer is a crown servant but it may in some 
circumstances include an independent contractor. 88 For the Crown to incur 
liability the employee must also be acting in the course of employment 
Although not precisely defined, this has been given a wide interpretation, 
including actions expressly forbidden by the employer and to some degree, 
intentional wrongdoing incidental to duties. 89 Vicarious liability is a strict 
liability. Before it can attach to an employer, such as the Crown, there must 
first be an employee who is found personally liable. Liability therefore depends 
on establishing not only the personal liability of the employee, but the requisite 
relationship between the Crown and the employee, and that the wrongdoing 
has arisen out of this relationship. There are certain limits specifically placed on 
the extent of the Crown's vicarious liability. Section 6(5) was at issue in 
Baigent, it protects anyone exercising or purporting to exercise judicial 
process.90 The majority held that an action would not lie unless the crown 
servant were acting in bad faith. Gault J was prepared to read this section 
down which would be necessary if the 'existing law' approach was to be 
maintained. 
B) Vicarious Liability in Practice 
86 Section 6(1), as if it were "a private person of full age and capacity". 
87 Todd, above n 42,at 790; P Hogg, above n 42, at 86. 
88 Vicarious liability for independant contractors will only arise when the duties 
carried out by the contractor have, by statute or contract, been placed upon the 
Crown as employer. See Todd, above n 42, p 799. 
89 Todd, above n 42, p 806-810; K Sandstrom "Personal and Vicarious 
Liability for the Wrongful Acts of Government Officials: An Approach for 
Liability Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1990) 24 UBCL Rev 
229, 240- 241 
90 See above text, Part One, 'Crown Immunity'. 
Conceptually vicarious liability is a somewhat artificial construct When 
applied to the Crown it is particularly strained. It relies on the fiction of finding 
an official personally liable, where in reality the actor's power is 
indistinguishable from his or her position. 91 In complex government 
organisations it may be impossible to attach individual responsibility to any one 
official. Where the infringement is the result of a number of government 
actions or decisions the responsible official may not always be apparent The 
resulting search for individual liability will not only be time consuming but 
detrimental to the victims chances of recovery.92 For example, in a prison 
situation if the inmates were subjected to inhuman treatment (section 10, Bill 
of Rights) the Crown may escape liability and a victim left with no remedy, if 
the party responsible can not be proved liable. Such a search diverts the court's 
attention from the real issue of providing a remedy for the breach.93 In contrast 
to the direct liability approach of the majority in Baigent, Crown liability would 
be established merely by proving the responsible party was acting under a 
public power, whether individually identifiable or not. 94 
C) The "Side Effects" of Personal Liability 
The biggest potential difficulty of using vicarious liability in Bill of Rights 
claims is the extra interests that come with the need to first establish personal 
liability. When Crown liability depends upon finding the personal liability of an 
official, it must be decided whether the official should be liable in the 
circumstances. Thus a new set of policy considerations are added to the 
91 SK McCall um "Personal Liability of Public Servants: An Anachronism" 
(1984) 27 Pub Admin 611, 616. 
92 K Sandstrom, above n 89, at 243. 
93 CR Wise "Suits Against Federal Employees for Constitutional Violations: A 
Search for Reasonableness" (1985) 45 Pub Admin Rev 845 852. 
94 Scope of liable persons defined in s 3 NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
equation. As a result a degree of immunity may be given to the official in an 
effort to avoid the undesirable consequences of personal official liability. 
There are two main reasons for a finding of immunity from personal liability. 
The first is based on notions of justice. It may not be considered appropriate to 
find liability, in an individual capacity, where the actor is merely carrying out 
the duties of the government. This would be particularly so where the actor is 
unable to control the causes of a breach or does not have the capacity to rectify 
it 95 The second reason is the over-deterrent effect it may have on future 
government action. While it may be a desirable remedial goal to deter future 
breaches of the Bill of Rights, the process of establishing personal liability may 
have a "chilling" effect on the good faith execution of an official's public 
duties. 96 It is in the wider interests of society to have a government which is 
vigorous in its decision making, and not hampered by the fear of personal 
liability.97 For example judicial immunity is founded on the idea of encouraging 
independent judicial decision making, free from the threat of liability. 
D) US Approach personal liability and qualified immunity 
In the United States constitutional actions against a federal official may be 
brought under a Bivens. This constitutional tort action can be distinguished 
from vicarious liability in that the doctrine of sovereign immunity means the 
ultimate remedy lies against the personal official. However vicarious liability 
similarly involves the finding of official liability. As has been shown the same 
considerations, involving personal liability, are applied to actions which result 
in vicarious liability. The aim of this part of the paper is two fold. Firstly to 
show how the doctrine of qualified and absolute immunity have been 
developed in the united states system to the detriment of those victims of 
95 CB Whitman "Constitutional Torts" (1980) 79 Michigan L Rev 5 at 56. 
96 Dellinger, above n 4, p 1535. 
97 P Shuck, above n 78, p 21, sees it as a trade off between the desire to deter 
future breaches and a need for vigorous decision making. 
constitutional violations. Secondly to highlight the dangers of averting 
attention from the interests of the victim. The experience in the United States 
highlights the difficulty of balancing the interests of an official with those of 
providing an effective remedy. The ultimate end of this examination is to 
highlight the advantages of direct government liability. 
Perhaps the jurisdiction cited with the longest history of civil and political 
rights is the United States. The United States operates under a duel system of 
state and federal government liability. For persons acting under colour of state 
authority, liability arises under section 1983 of the United States Code.98 The 
section remained largely ineffective until the 1961 Supreme Court decision in 
Monroe v Pape. 99 Where the recovery of monetary compensation for breaches 
of constitutional rights, was allowed against state officials. 100 By placing the 
jurisdiction in the federal courts, relief became more accessible. Previously 
applicants had to exhaust remedies at a state level, which often subject to local 
pressures, led to limited success. 101 A corollary to section 1983 did not exist 
for constitutional breaches by federal officials until 1971. In the landmark 
decision of Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics 102 the Supreme Court decided an action would lie against federal 
officials, based directly upon the fourth amendment to the Constitution. 103 
Similar to the Court's dilemma in Baigent, the United States constitution does 
not contain a remedies clause, thus making it necessary to infer remedies 
98 42 USC s 1983 (1982). Although its current codification was in 1982, its 
origins date back to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 eh 22, s 1, 17 Stat 13. It 
reads: 
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
juridiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress. 
99 365 us 167 (1961) 
100 Above n 171-187. 
101 Pilkington, above n 77, at 521. 
102 403 us 388 (1971) 
103 Extended to the claims under the fifith amendment, Davis v Passman 442 
US 228 (1979), and eigth amendment, Carlson v Green 446 US 14 (1980). 
directly. The resulting "constitutional tort" was a mirror of section 1983, with 
liability lying against federal officials. 104 That liability does not extended 
vicariously to the federal government, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
prevents claims unless there is a derogation of immunity by express statutory 
authority. 105 In reality however, the federal government indemnifies successful 
claims against its officials. 106 The nature of the Bivens action varies from the 
model adopted by the Court of Appeal in Baigent in that it lies as a private 
action. However like Baigent, claims do not depend on existing heads of tort. 
Bivens allowed new heads of tort, based directly on the Constitution. Thus for 
example the claimant in Bivens, was seeking compensation for unreasonable 
search and seizure and not for trespass to person or property. 
E) The Doctrine of qualified immunity 
The rationale for the doctrine of qualified immunity is based on the need to 
balance the competing interests of avoiding the detrimental effects of personal 
liability, while allowing a claimant to seek a remedy. The practice of the 
Federal Government in indemnifying its employee's has lead some 
commentators to question whether a constitutional tort action has in reality 
such a harmful deterrent effect 107 Ultimately though the law reflects the 
judicial perceptions, these being firmly of the view that official liability incurs a 
detrimental cost to vigorous decision making. 108 Thus the doctrine of qualified 
104 Bivens.above n 99, p 395-97. 
105 Some commentators have argued that if the constitution is able to found an 
action then it should also effectively be able to pierce the soveriegn immunity. 
See, e.g. Dillinger, above n 4, p 1556. 
106 Eisenberg and Schwab "The Reality of Constitutional Tort 
Litigation"(1987) 72 Cornell L Rev 641, 686. 
107 See D J Meltzer "Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials: Plantiffs and Defendants as Private Attorney-Generals"(1988) 88 
Colum L Rev 247,284. 
108
• Eisenberg and Schwab, above n 106, p 651-52. 
immunity has been introduced to mitigate these effects. It acts as more than 
merely a defence by providing actual immunity from suit 109 The current test 
was expounded in Harlow v Fitz.gerald, 110 where the Supreme Court adopted 
an objective test of good faith, disregarding the officials actual state of mind. A 
subjective element to the test, which had been required previously, was 
abandoned on the grounds of expediency, to allow claims to be decided at 
summary judgement without discovery. 111 It was held an official would have 
immunity unless he or she was acting in breach of "clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known". 112 
The public policy against holding an official liable was dominant in the 
reasoning of the Court: "Where an official's duties legitimately require action 
in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be 
better served by action taken with independence and without fear of 
consequences."113 
It can be seen that the doctrine of qualified immunity is essentially instrumental 
and not based on notions of justice. 114 
The scope of the doctrine is extremely wide, leading some commentators to 
criticise the Courts for making an award under the constitution almost 
impossible to achieve. 115 In 1985 an assessment of the 12,000 Bivens suits filed 
found only thirty had resulted in judgements for the plaintiffs, and only a 
109 Mitchell v Forsyth 472 US 511 (1985). 
110 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
111 Above n, at 816-19. A subjective componant required not only a 
reasonable belief but that the official must act in good faith, Pierson v Ray 386 
US 547 (1967), Wood v Strickland 420 US 308 (1975). 
112 Above n, at 818. 
113 Above n, at 816. 
114 S Nahmod "Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different 
View" (1990) 76 Virginia LR 997, 1004. For a contrary view see JC Jefferies 
"Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in 
Constitutional Torts" (1990) 75 Virginia LR 1461. 
115 See, eg, PM Rosen ''The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled 
Promise" (1989) 67 North Carolina Law Rev 337. 
meagre four judgements had actually been paid out 116 Contributing causes to 
this lack of availability have been identified as procedural impediments, like the 
difficulty in locating the liable official, or persuading a jury to find a federal 
employee personally liable. The major reason for the lack of success however, 
has been attributed to the Court's stringent doctrine of qualified immunity. 117 
The problems of trying to balance two competing policies, protecting an 
official on the one hand and providing a remedy on the other, has effectively 
denied United States claimants. There is a growing body of commentators 
calling for a constitutional tort that lies directly against the Federal 
Government, specifically to alleviate this clash of interests. 
Conclusions 
Rights litigation opens up particular policy areas which effect not only the 
interests of the individual but systemic interests that lie in the society. The most 
evident interest is that of the individual in the need for compensation for a 
breach. The award may also embody some the wider remedial goals of 
deterring future breaches, or as a statement on the worth of the right. The 
systemic interests range from the need for vigorous performance of 
government tasks through to the overall considerations of who and how should 
the cost be borne. Not only is any award necessarily funded by the public 
116 Written statement of John Farley, III, Director, Torts Branch, Civil 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Litigation Section of the Bar of 
the District of Columbia (May 1985). Cited in P M Rosen, above n at 343. 
117 Rosen, above n 115, p 343. 
purse, but it may have a chilling effect on the good faith execution of public 
duties. 
With the direct liability approach the Court has adopted in Baigent, the 
systemic costs have been minimised. There is no need to consider the impact of 
liability upon the official concerned as they are no longer part of the equation. 
Indemnity for a breach is a direct responsibility of the government owed to the 
aggrieved citizen. In adopting such an approach the deterrent effect of an 
award has been reduced, however this is arguably a matter best left to the 
government to rectify. The state institution can correct the official misconduct 
or error, as necessary. They will be in a better position to make changes to the 
system to ensure future compliance. There is still some room for personal 
official liability in egregious cases under the Baigent cause of action, as actions 
may still be brought in tort 118 
The contrary line adopted by Gault J, where the interest of the victim will only 
be redressed through the liability of the individual officer, will lead to 
circumstances where it is not only unjust but undesirable to hold the individual 
officer liable. 
The issue of a remedy must involve the balancing of this compensatory goal 
with wider interests. It is suggested that the form of the Baigents action, 
where the government is directly liable allows the greatest freedom to pursue 
this line. 
A new public law cause of action is an appropriate break from traditional tort 
law. The Bill of Rights presents new interests, to which the existing tort law 
was not designed to cope. Crown liability in tort is not an unequivocal fact 
Many officials are surrounded by immunity, and liability of the Crown itself is 
limited. If a claim is successful then it must be channelled into the appropriate 
area of tort damages to recover. An area that has difficulty coping with the non 
118 Cooke P, p 15, states: "A legitimate alternative approach, having the 
advantage of simplicity, would be to make a global award under the Bill of 
Rights and nominal or concurrent awards on any other successful causes of 
action" 
tangible harm that Bill of Rights actions will involve. In tort law the focus 
remains as much on the perpetrator of the breach as the victim themselves. As 
with the qualified immunity defence in the United States, a balancing of policy 
in tort need also protect the interest of the official, often to the detriment of the 
victim. If the 'existing law' approach of Gault J was adopted the success of 
future claims would depend as much on the merits of the case, as the ability to 
manipulate existing heads of law. 
The Court has before it a clearly defined pathway to remedy violations of the 
Bill. It is a system that allows for the an effective remedy to be provided to the 
victim of a breach, without the limits and uncertainty of existing law. The issue 
of state of mind will no doubt be raised in future cases. Should the liability 
under a Baigent action be strict liability, once a breach of the right has been 
established? The United States test of qualified immunity has acted to 
effectively nullify the availability of a "constitutional tort" action. Their 
experience indicates that a state of mind requirement is based on a policy that 
is not present in the Baigent system of direct liability. 119 Arguably with the 
direct relationship between the citizen and state, the need to incorporate a state 
of mind requirement has been pre-empted, and any considerations of state of 
mind should go to quantum. The Bill itself contains limits to government 
liability. Some of the substantive rights have there own inherent limitations. For 
example, 'unreasonable search and seizure' and 'peaceful assembly'. Where the 
right is prescribed without an inherent limitation, the court may apply section 5 
where necessary: 
5. Justified limltations- Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
If the primary goal is to provide a system with an effective remedy, the court 
has adopted the most efficient delivery method. It is submitted that in future 
119 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, above n 107. 
cases while the court may look to limit the scope of the rights, it should keep a 
clean avenue to a remedy once a breach has been established. 
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